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"INVOLUNTARY STRICT FORECLOSURE" UNDER 
SECTION 9-505(2) OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE: TARPIT FOR THE TARDY CREDITOR 
Wendell H. Holmes* 
INTRODUCTION 
Secured parties everywhere should harken to the tale of poor Byron 
Millican.1 It seems that in May 1979, Mr. Millican (d/b/a Millican Auto 
Sales) had the misfortune to sell a used Buick Skylark to one Jenny Tur­
ner, taking in payment a retail installment contract for the price plus 
finance charge totalling $4,228.20. • The contract was sold with recourse 
by Millican to the First National Bank of New Albany, Mississippi. Un­
fortunately for Mr. Millican, but all too familiar to those in the used car 
business, Turner proved to be a poor credit risk; after making only a few 
of the scheduled 36 payments, Turner defaulted. 8 
Even more unfortunately for Mr. Millican, the car, once located by 
the repossession agent of the Bank,' was a mess.11 It attracted no interest �rom potential buyers after the Bank reassigned the contract to Millican 
m July 1981. 8 Finally, in February 1982, Millican sued Turner for the 
amount he had paid the bank upon reassignment, interest, collection fees, 
and costs. The trial court ultimately held for Turner. No doubt to the 
amazement of both Millican and his attorney, in Millican v. Turner' the 
�upreme Court of Mississippi upheld the lower court's basic interpreta­
tion of section 9-505(2)8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC): If Mil­
lican's retention of the car for six months before filing suit was "an 
unreasonably long time," he would be deemed to have retained the car in 
satisfaction of the debt and barred from suing on the underlying obliga-
• Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. B.A. 1974, Mill· 
saps College; J.D. 1977, Tulane University. 
1. See Millican v. Turner, 503 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1987). 
2. Id. at 290. 
3. Id. 
4. There was substantial disagreement as to timing: Turner claimed the repossession 
�
�rred in "August or December of 1979"; Millican placed it in the "spring of 1981." Id. at 
. 
5. According to the court, when the repo man located the car, "the tires were flat, the 
windshield was broken, the inside door panels were loose, and grass had grown up around 
the car, as if it had been abandoned." Id. 
6. Millican claimed that he attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell the car for 10 to 12 
rnonths after reassignment. Id. 
7. 503 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1987). 
8. Miss. ConE ANN. § 75-9-505(2) (Supp. 1989). For the full uniform text of the stat­ute, see infra text at note 44. 
289 
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tion.' The court remanded the case for a factual determination of 
whether Millican's delay in acting was unreasonably long.10 
Imagine the incredulity with which Mr. Millican must have received 
the news that he might have discharged a debt of at least $2,583.90 (the 
amount he was required to pay the Bank) by retaining possession, for six 
months prior to filing suit, of a car with an estimated worth of  $800.00.11 
On the other hand, had Mr. Millican-or his lawyer-been attentive to 
the caselaw developing under section 9-505(2), he might have been spared 
any shock. 
No doubt it comes as little surprise that more cases interpreting arti­
cle 9 of the UCC deal with issues of default than any other single topic. 
In turn, within the area of default the preponderance of cases has in­
volved the effect of allegedly commercially unreasonable sales of collat­
eral on the secured party's right to a deficiency under section 9-504. 11 
Likewise, scholarly writing on default has focused primarily upon section 
9-504 and the problems attendant to resale.18 Largely unnoticed, however, 
9. Millican, 503 So. 2d at 291 -92. The history of the litigation is, itself, fairly interest­
ing. Turner first defended on the ground that Millican had breached his duties under § 9-
504 in making a commercially unreasonable sale and not giving her notice of the sale. No 
sale having been made, of course, that argument did not get very far, and Turner eventually 
confessed a motion to dismiss her counterclaim for violation of § 9-504. Id. at 290. However, 
Turner thereafter amended her answer to raise retention in satisfaction of § 9-505 (2). The 
trial court (sitting without a jury) returned a verdict for Turner based on both § 9-505(2) 
and common law accord and satisfaction. Turner wisely elected not to pursue the accord 
and satisfaction theory on appeal, since the facts did not support it. See RESTATEMENT (SEC­
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1979) (defining "accord" a s  a contract whereby a party promises 
to accept a substituted p erformance in satisfaction of an existing duty on the part of the 
performing party). Since there was no mutual assent to any settlement, an accord and satis· 
faction could not have occurred. 
For further discussion of the invocation of accord and satisfaction in cases under § 9-
505(2), see infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
10. Millican, 503 So. 2d at 291 -92. The court suggested that the trier of fact should 
consider, inter alia, the type of collateral, depreciation rate, and relevant market, and that 
expert testimony might w ell be introduced to aid the fact-finder. Id. 
11. Id. at 290. Note also the corresponding evaporation of whatever settlement lever· 
age Millican might otherwise have had prior to the appeal. 
1 2. For general background and collections of cases on this issue, see 9 R. ANDERSON. 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-504:79 to :94 (1 985); 9 W. HAWKLAND, R. LORD & C. LEWIS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-507:07 (1 986 ); T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CooE 
COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST § 9-504[A][8) (Cum. Supp. No. 1 1 989); J. W HITE & R. SUM· 
MERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-1 9  (3d ed. 1 988). For further discussion ,  see infra 
notes 29-43 and accompanying text . 
. . 13. For recent articles on this issue, see Donaldson, Commercially Reasonable Dis
po· 
s1twn of Collateral Under Article 9 of the UCC: The Question of the Burden of Proof, 20 
U.C.C. L.J. 307 (1 988); Garner & Alber, Disposition of Repossessed Goods Under Article 9 
of th� Texas U.C.C., 1 1  Tux. TECH L. REV. 563 (1 980 ); Page, A Secured Party's Right to a 
Deficiency Judgment After Non-Compliance with the Resale Provisions of Article 9, 60 
N.D.L. REv. 531 (1 984 ); Rudow, Determining the Commercial Reasonableness of Sale of 
�e�ossessed Collateral, 1 9  U.C.C. L.J. 139 (1986); Comment, Failure of Notice in the Dispo· 
sitwn of Collateral: The Effect on Debtor and Creditor Rights Under the Alabama Uni· 
form 
_
Commercial Code, 14 CuMB. L. REv. 181 (1 984); Comment, California Article 9 No­
Defic1ency Rule: Undermining the Secured Party's Security, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 153 (1982); 
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is an ever-expanding number of cases where the secured party does not 
dispose of the collateral, at least for some more or less extended time, but 
rather retains it without communicating with the debtor. When he finally 
sues on the debt-with or without having first sold the collateral-the 
question addressed in Millican is posed: What, if anything, are the conse­
quences of delay? Since the "strict foreclosure" provision of the UCC, 
section 9-505(2), 14 governs expressly only those instances in which a se­
cured party notifies the debtor of his desire to keep the collateral in satis­
faction of the debt, courts have commonly gone beyond the language of 
the Code to fashion a response. With increasing frequency, the response, 
as in Millican, is that section 9-505(2) can be forced upon the secured 
party as well as elected by him-in the words of one authority, that the 
secured party may be subject to "involuntary strict foreclosure. nu 
This article will analyze the concept of involuntary strict foreclosure 
and attempt to place it within the broader context of creditors' remedies 
and debtors' rights under part 5 of article 9. The article first reviews the 
remedial scheme of part 5 and focuses upon the ostensible role of section 
9-505(2) within the statutory pattern. It then discusses the real and per­
sonal property analogues to section 9-505(2) and demonstrates that they 
are imperfect frames of reference for interpretation of section 9-505(2). 
Thereafter, the article reviews three lines of cases that have developed 
under section 9-505(2) and suggests that the proper approach is taken by 
those courts that have rejected the notion of involuntary strict foreclo­
sure. The article concludes, however, that the judicial experience with 
section 9-505(2), just as with the resale cases under section 9-504, illus­
trates that the remedial provisions of part 5 of article 9 are fundamen­
tally flawed and in need of revision. 
I. THE ARTICLE 9 REMEDIAL SCHEME 
A. Creditors' Remedies 
The default and realization rules of part 5 of article 916 give the se­
cured party maximum freedom of choice in formulating a plan for collect­
ing the balance of the secured indebtedness. The fundamental rule is 
�tated in section 9-501: "[The secured party] may reduce his claim to 
Judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any 
av�ilable judicial pr�edure . . . . The rights and remedies ref erred to in 
this subsection are cumulative."17 
Comment, The Secured Creditor's Right to a Deficiency Judgment After Misbehavior Under U.C.C. § 9-504(3), 21 Hous. L. REv. 359 (1984). . 14. For the full text of the section, see infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
15. W. HAWKLAND, R. LORD & C. LEWIS, supra note 12, § 9-505:09. 
16. u.c.c. §§ 9-501 to 507 (1987). . . 
17. U.C.C. § 9-50l(l) (!987). The primary purpose for this state��nt 1s to reject the 
doctrine of election of remedies which applied at common law to cond1t10nal sales transac­tions. Under this rule, the vendor could either repossess or sue on the debt, but not both; 
assertion of either right would forfeit the other. See, e.g., Warren, Statutory Damage� �
nd 
the Conditional Sale, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 289, 290-91 (1959). Sections 9-501(1) and (5) v1t1ate 
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The Code then proceeds in a logical progression. Under section 9-503, 
default entitles the secured party to possession of the collateral; this may 
be effected either through judicial proceedings such as replevin or by self­
help if there is no breach of the peace.18 Assuming that after default there 
is no mutually negotiated settlement of  the secured party's claim,19 he 
may proceed in regard to the collateral in two ways: either resale under 
section 9-504 (with the right thereafter to sue for any deficiency30) or re­
tention in full satisfaction of the indebtedness under section 9-505. In all 
events, the rules are broad, generally non-technical, and keyed to the 
standard of "commercial reasonableness." In the words of one commenta­
tor, the goals of the Code are twofold: 
First, to assure the highest possible realization price, a considerable dis­
cretion is conferred upon the secured party seeking to realize upon his 
collateral. There is a remarkable absence of stringent requirements for 
mandatory public sales, detailed public notices, or other specific 
prohibitions. For the most part, the Code requires only that the secured 
party must be "commercially reasonable" in making the disposition. 
Second, the Code aims at increasing the ability of a court to review the 
conduct of the secured party in the disposition of the collateral. An 
explicit statutory grant permits the court to interfere p rospectively 
with dispositions that will violate the Code requirements and to require 
the payment of money damages when the defective dispositions have 
already occurred. 21 
the idea of election. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the U.C.C., 
47 MINN. L. REV. 205, 249 (1962). The Uniform Conditional Sales Act also rejected the elec­
tion of remedies doctrine. U.C.S.A. § 24 (1918). 
In theory, then, the secured party under article 9 can pursue various avenues for collec­
tion simultaneously, subject only to the imperative that he cannot collect more than the 
amount owed. White and Summers note, however, that the cases on "double-barrel" attacks 
on debtors are split, with some courts allowing multiple remedies to be pursued simultane· 
ously, while others force the secured party to exhaust one remedy before pursuing the other. 
In either event, courts seem sensitive to the underlying problem of creditor harassment of 
debtors. J. WHITE & R SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-4, at 1197-98. 
18. u.c.c. § 9-503 (1987). 
19. The U.C.C. prohibits any pre-default waiver of rights by debtors. Id. § 9-504(3). 
This was also the approach of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. U.C.S.A. § 26  (1918). 
20. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1987). 
21. Hogan, supra note 17, at 207. In so doing, the Code drafters drew heavily from 
experience under the two most important pre-Code statutes, the Uniform Conditional Sales 
Act (UCSA) and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA). 
The UCSA contained detailed rules governing the seller's rights upon default. E.g., un· 
less the seller gave the buyer prior notice of his intention to repossess under§ 17 (in which 
case the buyer's redemption rights were eliminated), he was forced to hold the goods for 10 
days, during which the buyer could redeem by complying with the terms of § 18. In any 
event, unless the seller elected to retain the goods under § 23, he was required under § 19 to 
make a sale at public action, with detailed rules on time and notice (including posting and 
publication i� some cases). As Grant Gilmore pointed out, not only did this virtually guar­
antee a deficiency, but also it contained a plethora of possibilities for technical errors by the 
seller that engendered constant challenges by defaulting buyers. G. GILMORE, SECURITY IN· 
TERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 44.4, at 1227-28 (1965). The attempt (albeit largely unsuc· 
cessful) of the Code drafters to encourage private rather than public sales is perhaps the 
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B. Debtor's Rights 
The rights provided to the defaulting debtor under article 9 can be 
easily summarized. First, the debtor is entitled to know what the secured 
party intends to do with the collateral. If the secured party plans to sell 
it, then he must give the debtor notice of the sale unless the collateral is 
perishable, is subject to a rapid decline in value, or is sold on a recognized 
market. 22 If the creditor's intent is to keep it in satisfaction of the debt, 
then he must give the debtor notice of this as well; and if the debtor 
objects, he can force a sale. u In either event, if the collateral is sold, the 
debtor has a right to any surplus remaining after payment of the ex­
�enses of disposition, the primary secured debt, and subordinate security 
interests of which the selling secured party has been notified in writing. 24 
The debtor also has a right of redemption.I& 
· 
While section 9-504 on resale is often said to be the central rule of 
part 5 for the secured party,11 the key rules from the perspective of the 
debtor are those found in section 9-507. Because of the importance of 
most important legacy of the UCSA experience. U.C.C. § 9-504 official comment 1 (1977). 
On the other hand, the UTRA was almost completely unregulated as regards default. 
Under the UTRA, the entruster could, after five-days notice to the trustee (either personal 
or ordinary mail), "sell the goods, documents or instruments for the trustee's account, at public or private sale, and (could) at public sale himself become a purchaser." U.T.R.A. § 
6(3){b). As Gilmore notes, rarely did the trustee have any equity to protect, and he asserts 
that there was never a case in which an entruster was sued for improper disposition. G. 
GILMORE, supra, at 1228-30. The Code embraces the UTRA approach, but adds the talis­
manic mandate of commercial reasonableness and provision for judicial review under § 9-
507· See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. 
. 
22. The Code requires notice of the time and place of a public sale, or the time after 
which a private sale is to be made. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987). The Code does not specify arbitrary time limits for either sale or notice except for the special case of consumer goods 
under § 9-505(1). See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Code does not explicitly demand even written notice, although the command that notice be "sent" in § 9-
504(3), coupled with the definition of "send," connotes the contemplation of written notice. See U.C.C. § 1-201(38)(1987) ("send" defined as "in connection with any writing or notice 
· · 
· to deposit in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other usual means of communi­
cation"). In any event, only the foolhardy creditor would rely upon oral ·(ergo objectively 
�nverifiable) notice to satisfy § 9-504. The debtor may, of course, waive the right to notifica­tion after default. Id. § 9-504(3). 
23. u.c.c. § 9-505(2) (1987). 
24. Id. § 9-504(1)(2). 
25. Id. § 9-506: 
At any time before the. secured party has disposed of collateral or entered 
into a contract for its disposition under section 9-504 or before the obligation 
has been discharged under section 9-505(2) the debtor or any other secured 
Party may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral 
by tendering f ulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the 
expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and pre­
paring the collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and to the extent 
provided in the agreement and not prohibited by law, his reasonable attorneys' 
fees and legal expenses. 
26. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-9, at 1213 (§ 9-504 is "guts" of part 5). 
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section 9-507 to the thesis of this article, it is set forth in full below: 
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in 
accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered 
or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition 
has occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose 
security interest has been made known to the secured party prior to the 
disposition has a right to recover from the secured party any loss 
caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part. If the 
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover in any 
event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten per 
cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential 
plus 10 per cent of the cash price. 
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale 
at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the 
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not 
made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either 
sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market there­
for or if he sells at the price current in such market at the time of his 
sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commer­
cial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in 
a commercially reasonable manner. The principles stated in the two 
preceding sentences with respect to sale also apply as may be appropri­
ate to other types of disposition. A disposition which has been approved 
in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or 
representative of creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be commer­
cially reasonable, but this sentence does not indicate that any such ap­
proval must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any 
disposition not so approved is not commercially reasonable. 27 
While much of this section is self-explanatory, for present purposes 
attention should be drawn to the first two sentences of subsection (1). 
The first sentence countenances pre-disposition judicial review of the se­
cured party's conduct and authorizes the court to issue either mandatory 
or prohibitory injunctions, as appropriate, to redress creditor misconduct, 
The second sentence, however, deals with post-disposition review of cred­
itor misconduct, on its face entitling the debtor to recover damages for 
"any loss caused." Probably the key default issue under the Code, how­
ever, has been what other relief, beyond damages proved, is available to 
the aggrieved debtor-most especially, the denial of  a deficiency 
judgment. 28 
As previously noted, where the creditor fails to comply with the re­
sale rules of section 9-504, the issue of his right to a deficiency has been 
repeatedly litigated and the results well-documented in the academic 
literature. 29 While I see no need in this article to rep low this ground at 
27. U.C.C. § 9-507 (1987). 
28. Obviously, other claims may be asserted: for example, damages in conversion for 
wrongful repossession under § 9-503. 
29. For cases and commentary on this issue, see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying 
text. 
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length, a brief summary is necessary for the reader who is not well-ac­
quainted with this issue. 30 In effect, three divergent lines of cases have 
arisen: The "absolute bar" cases; the "rebuttable presumption" cases; and 
the "damages only" cases. 31 
The absolute bar cases hold, on various theories, that the misbe­
having creditor loses entirely his right to a deficiency. The seminal case, 
Skeels v. Universal C.I. T. Credit Corp.,32 viewed the essential injury as 
the loss of the debtor's right of redemption when deprived of notice and 
the opportunity to bid at the sale. While other courts have espoused dif­
ferent rationales, the basic premise is stated by Professor Gilmore: "We 
may conclude that the secured party's compliance with the default provi­
sions of Part 5-both the formal requirements of notice and the like and 
the substantial requirement of a 'commercially reasonable sale'-is a con­
dition precedent to the recovery of a deficiency."33 
While Gilmore's prescience about much of the future of Article 9 is 
undeniable, on this point he fell wide of the mark, because the majority of 
jurisdictions have adopted the "rebuttable presumption" rule. The lead­
ing case; Norton v. First National Bank,34 held that the secured party 
who failed to give notice was not absolutely barred from a deficiency. 
Rather, the court stated that it would "indulge the presumption in the 
first instance that the collateral was worth at least the amount of the 
debt, thereby shifting to the creditor the burden of proving the amount 
that should reasonably have been obtained through a sale conducted ac­
cording to law. "35 By virtue of this decision and a series of others that 
ensued,36 the rebuttable presumption rule also became known as the "Ar­
kansas Rule."37 This name has now, however, assumed a delicious irony: 
In 1987, Arkansas abandoned the rebuttable presumption rule in favor of 
the absolute bar rule. se Whether this presages a more general shift in that 
direction is, of course, too early to tell. 39 
30. For a recent case summarizing the various approaches, see Wang v. Wang, 440 N.W.2d 740 (S.D. 1989). Perhaps the most useful general discussio� is in J. W
.
HITE &. R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-19, and the following text draws heavily upon their treatise. 
31. The last characterization is that of the author only. 
32. 2 2 2  F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 
1964). 
33. G. GILMORE, supra note 21, § 44.9.4, at 1264. 
34. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). 
35. Id. at 150, 398 S.W.2d at 542. 
36 . For summaries, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1 2, § 25-19, at 1249-50 nn.20-28. 
37. See, e.g., Wang v. Wang, 440 N.W.2d 740 (S.D. 1989). 
38. First State Bank of Morrilton v. Hallett, 291 Ark. 37, 7 22 S.W.2d 555 (1987). It 
should be noted that this ideological shift is not unique. Georgia at one time embraced the 
absolute bar rule, Gurwitch v. Luxrest Furniture Mfg., 233 Ga. 934, 214 S.E.2d 373 (1975), 
but in 1987 it changed to the rebuttable preswnption rule. Emmons v. Burkett, 256 Ga. 855, 
353 S.E.2d 908 (1987). . 
39. As of this writing the most recent state supreme court cai:� o� the issue
, Wang v. 
Wang, 440 N.W.2d 740 (S.D. 1989), a dopted the "Arkansas Rule, without ackn
owledge-
ment that it is no longer the rule in Arkansas. 
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Finally, a smaller number of courts have read the Code literally and 
found that the debtor is entitled only to the relief that section 9-507(1) 
explicitly provides: a set-off for whatever damages he can prove he suf­
fered as a result of the secured party's misdoings. An illustrative case is 
Beneficial Finance Co. v. Young,40 in which the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma held that damages under section 9-507(1) adequately protected 
debtors. The court specifically noted that part 5 is silent on any grounds 
for denial of a deficiency and stated that any such forfeiture would be 
impermissible as punitive damages not sanctioned by section 1 - 106.'1 
Young and similar cases are no doubt correct in holding that part 5 
of article 9 contains no suggestion of any intention to bar a creditor's 
right to a deficiency based solely upon noncompliance with the statute. 
Were that the end of the issue one could unreservedly endorse the result 
in Young. Unfortunately, it is not. To say that an exclusive statutory 
right to actual damages proved adequately protects debtors (at least in 
the absence of affirmatively tortious conduct) is either breathtakingly dis­
ingenuous or naive. Even the principal drafter of article 9, Professor Gil­
more, referred to the "liability for loss" standard in section 9-507(1) as a 
rule "of almost childlike simplicity" and suggested that "the draftsmen 
might have been better advised if they had spelled out their intentions 
somewhat more clearly."41 It may be true, as Gilmore goes on to suggest, 
that the drafters thought that it was self-evident that a proper resale was 
a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency. That, after all, was the 
almost universal result in cases construing the Uniform Conditional Sales 
Act notwithstanding express provision for only a right to " actual dam­
ages, if any," and in all events a statutory penalty of  "one-fourth of the 
sum of all payments which have been made . . . plus interest. "43 We are 
now, however, a generation away from the prior uniform security laws, 
and many lawyers and judges who deal with these issues know only of  the 
ucc. 
Thus, it is not self-evident that the UCC does not mean just what it 
says. What it says is, however, not a sufficient shield for the debtor in 
many cases. To be sure, there are clearly cases in which technical non· 
compliance does not injure the debtor in any quantifiable way. In those 
cases, imposition of the "absolute bar" rule is surely penal, and one need 
go no further than the Code language to reach an equitable result. It is 
40. 612 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1980). 
41. Id. at 1359. Under § 1-106, punitive damages are recoverable only "as specifically 
provided in this Act or by other rule of law." U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1987). The court stated that 
the 
��nial of a deficiency is penal in nature and that Article 9 obviously has no provision for 
punitive �am
.ages. However, the court went on to hold that such "punishment" of credito
rs 
could be Justified by a showing of "malice, fraud, or oppression." Young, 612 P.2d at 1360. 
For other cases adopting the "damages only" rule, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra 
note 12, § 25-19, at 1252 nn. 32-34. 
42· G. �ILMORE, supra note 21, § 44.9.2, at 1255. Interestingly, Louisiana, the last state 
to enact Article 9, adopted the "damages only" position statutorily. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-507(1) (Supp. 1991). 
43. U.C.S.A. § 25 (1918); see G. GILMORE, supra note 21, § 44.9.2, at 1256-57. 
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just as true that in other cases the debtor may very well suffer actual 
injury but have neither the resources, sophistication, nor opportunity to 
prove his damages at trial. In those instances, section 9-507(1) is simply 
ineffective, and history has shown that ineffective remedial rules will in­
variably lead courts to find some other means to police misconduct. The 
"rebuttable presumption" rule may be the most reasonable way of doing 
this. The place for such a device, however, is in the C ode itself, or inevita­
bly conflicting interpretations of a purportedly uniform statute will 
develop. 
The purpose of this brief exegesis of the deficiency dilemma under 
section 9-504 is to suggest that there are basic shortcomings in the Code's 
remedial scheme. What has seemingly gone unnoticed by many, however, 
is that courts have found another tool for reviewing other forms of per­
ceived creditor misconduct in the seemingly innocuous rule of "strict 
foreclosure" under section 9-505. Before examining those cases in detail, 
however, I will first discuss the literal provisions of section 9-505 and its 
intended role in part 5 of article 9. 
C. Section 9-505 
To the casual observer, the text of section 9-505 would appear to be 
the source of little controversy because it seems that it would, as a practi­
cal matter, b e  rarely invoked: 
(1) If the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash price in the 
case of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods or sixty 
per cent of the loan in the case of another security interest in consumer 
goods, and has not signed after default a statement renouncing or mod­
ifying his rights under this Part a secured party who has taken posses­
sion of collateral must dispose of it under Section 9-504 and if he fails 
to do so within ninety days after he takes possession the debtor at his 
option may recover in conversion or under Section 9-507(1) on secured 
party's liability. 
(2) In any other case involving consumer goods or any other collat­
eral a secured party in possession may, after default, propose to retain 
the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such 
proposal shall be sent to the debtor if he has not signed after default a 
statement renouncing or modifying his rights under this subsection. In 
the case of consumer goods n o  other notice need be given. In other 
cases notice shall be sent to any other secured party from whom the 
secured party has received (before sending his notice to the debtor or 
before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim 
of an interest in the collateral. If the secured party receives objection in 
writing from a person entitled to receive notification within twenty-one 
days after the notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the 
collateral under section 9-504. In the absence of such written objection 
the secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction of the 
debtor's obligation." 
44. U.C.C. § 9.505 (1987). Prior to 1 972, notice was required to be given under subsec-
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The rationale of subsection (1) is clear: If a consumer debtor has 
achieved substantial equity in the collateral-as he surely would upon 
payment of sixty per cent of the price-then that equity should be pre­
served by forcing the secured party to sell the collateral and presumably 
turn the surplus over to the debtor.411 Likewise, the ninety-day rule recog­
nizes that consumer goods ordinarily depreciate rapidly and that expedi­
tious action by the creditor should be mandated.46 Not surprisingly, this 
has generated very few reported cases."' In one sense, forcing a sale may 
be perverse, because the rate of depreciation may effectively guarantee a 
deficiency judgment. One should not overlook, however, that there is in 
addition to recovery in conversion an express penalty for violation of this 
section: the credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal indebt­
edness or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price.49 
At least one court has awarded this penalty where it exceeded the value 
of the collateral." 
The present focus is, of course, subsection (2). Obviously, after de­
fault the secured party and debtor may enter into a negotiated settlement 
that could entail the secured party's retention of the collateral plus pay­
ment by the debtor of all, part, or no  amount of the deficiency in the 
value of the collateral. If the secured party is satisfied with the collateral 
alone, though, section 9-505(2) provides a unilateral means to the same 
ends, so long as the debtor fails to object. 
Section 9-505(2) is generally described as a rule of convenience. In 
the words of the official comment, "[e]xperience has shown that the par­
ties are frequently better off without a resale of the collateral; hence this 
section sanctions [an) alternative arrangement."&0 So long as the debtor 
tion (2) to all secured parties who had proper ly filed a financing statement against the 
d.ebtor in addition to those whose interest was known to the secured party, and the requ
ired 
time period was 30 days. U.C.C. § 9-505(2)(1962). The class of persons entitled to notice was 
narrowed in 1972 to those who have given the secured party notice of their c l aims, and the 
time shortened to 21 days. A similar change regarding notice to other creditors was made in 
the resale rule. Compare U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1962) with U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987 ) .  
45 . U.C.C. § 9-505 official comment 1 (1987). Under the U niform Conditional Sales 
Act, resale (for any transaction) was mandatory if  the buyer had paid over 50% of the price. 
U.C.S.A. § 19 (1918). 
46. W. HAWKLAND, R. LORD & C. LEWIS, supra note 12, § 9-505:02, at 614. It should be 
noted that this is the sole provision in article 9 requiring the secured party to dispose of the 
collateral within an arbitrary time period. 
47. Those few include Keller v. La Rissa, Inc., 60 Haw. 1, 586 P.2d 1017 (1978) ;  Mar· 
shall v. Fulton Nat'! Bank, 145 Ga. App. 190, 243 S.E.2d 266 (1978); Chicago City Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Anderson, 26 Ill. App. 3d 421, 325 N.E.2d 701 (1975)· Michigan Nat'! Bank v. 
Marston, 29 Mich. App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1970) ; Charley v. Rico
' 
Motor Co. 82 N.M. 290, 
480 P.2d 404 (1971). 
' 
48. u.c.c. § 9-507(1) (1987) . 
49. See Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 83 N.M. 75, 488 P.2d 127 (1971 )  (statutory dam­ages of $236.32 awarded where conversion value was $231.47) . 
. 5o. �·C:�· § 9-505 official comment 1 (1987 ) .  It might be noted that the statute con­tams amb�g�ities that this article does not seek to address. First, it speaks of the secured 
P:;ty retammg the coll�teral "in satisfaction of the debtor's ob ligation." U.C.C. § 9-505(2) ( 87>· Presumably, this means retention of all collateral in complete satisfaction of the 
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would not expect to realize any appreciable surplus from the disposition 
of the collateral, one would assume that he would be all too happy to be 
absolved of his potential liability for a deficiency judgment (although he 
is also losing not only the collateral but also the payments he has made).61 
Gilmore explained the rationale for the rule as follows: "The best and 
simplest way of liquidating any secured transaction, default having oc­
curred, is for the secured party to keep the collateral as his own free of 
the debtor's equity, waiving any claim to a deficiency judgment."51 The 
only potential flaw Gilmore seems to have perceived in the process was 
the possibility of oppressive forfeiture agreements, but he viewed this as 
adequately addressed by "publicity through notice and the enlightened 
self-interest of the debtor, competing secured creditors, and representa­
tives of unsecured creditors in insolvency proceedings."68 
D. Section 9-505(2) Analogues 
Gilmore stated that the analogues of section 9-505(2) were twofold: 
the land mortgagee's right to a decree of strict foreclosure and the condi­
tional seller's right to eliminate the equity of redemption by repossessing 
the goods. 64 While the Code rule shares characteristics of both, neither is 
a perfect analogy. Indeed, the differences that exist suggest that even 
taken literally section 9-505(2) may not be a particularly wise provision. 
To begin with, strict foreclosure of a land mortgage clearly has one 
effect in common with the Code rule: The mortgagor loses his equity of 
obligation, b ut the Code is not explicit on this point. Of course, no one is hurt if the secured 
party elects to retain part of the collateral i n  satisfaction of all obligations, but such largesse 
on the creditor's part is highly unlikely. More pernicious would be a proposal to retain all of 
the collateral as satisfaction of only part of the obligation, meaning that a deficiency j udg­
ment wo uld still be possible. The Code's language does not expressly foreclose this, but 
surely it is beyond the policy of the statute. See w. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND's HANDBOOK ON 
CHAPTER 9 LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW § 5:10 (1990). 
Moreover, the statute does not contemplate strict foreclosure through the initiative of 
the debtor. Again, such an arrangement could be expressly negotiated, but what of the sim­
ple abando nment of the collateral by the debtor into  the secured party's possession? The 
last state to adopt article 9, Louisiana, added non-uniform amendments to § 9-505 to ad­
dress this. Under the Louisiana version, abandonment or surrender of collateral by a con­
sumer is deemed to be an offer in satisfaction of the debt or for sale, but the secured party 
will be deemed to have accepted the goods i n  satisfaction of the debt unless he gives con­
trary notice to the debtor within 20 days. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-505(3) (Supp. 1990). 
Conversely, i n  cases not involving consumer goods, abandonment or surrender of the collat­
eral is deemed to be for the purpose of sale, absent contrary written agreement. Id. § 10:9-
505(4). 
Of course, in other jurisdictions silent retention of the collateral following abandonment 
can give rise to the involuntary strict foreclosure problem that is the subject of this article. 
51. Hogan, supra note 17, at 215 n. 51. 
52. G. GILMORE, supra note 21, § 44.3, at 1220. 
53. Id. at 1226. The proceedings of the New York Law Revision Commission likewise 
reflect no aware ness of the potential for i nvoluntary strict foreclosure: See 2 Stste of. New York, Report of the Law Revision Commission and Record of Hearmgs on the Umform 
Commercial Code 1 113, 1170-71 (1954). 
54. G. GILMORE, supra note 21, § 44.3, at 1220. 
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redemption. 11 Indeed, strict foreclosure historically developed in response 
to the recognition of redemption rights and was initially the only means 
to their termination.69 However, in America strict foreclosure did not nec­
essarily deprive the mortgagee of his right to sue to enforce the personal 
obligation of the mortgagor and, thereby, to obtain a deficiency, although 
there was apparently a split of authority.'17 Moreover, strict foreclosure of 
a land mortgage was by definition a judicial proceeding, and in any event 
has now been abandoned in most jurisdictions in favor of sales, either 
judicial or by power-of-sale mortgages." Clearly, though, the land mort­
gagee could not by strict foreclosure cause a unilateral forfeiture of the 
equity of redemption without judicial intervention. 
In fact, in the sense that it is consensual rather than judicial in na­
ture and involves not only the elimination of the debtor's equity but also 
the satisfaction of the underlying obligation, section 9-505(2) more closely 
resembles the use of a deed absolute or deed in lieu of foreclosure. The 
deed absolute is a purchase of the mortgagor's equity of redemption in 
which the mortgagor conveys the fee simple title to the mortgagee in ex­
change for the cancellation of the underlying obligation.119 Like section 9-
505(2), this procedure appears to have obvious advantages to both credi­
tor and debtor: It is quicker than a foreclosure sale, nonadversarial, mini­
mizes expenses, is confidential rather than public, and settles each party's 
rights in a single transaction.60 On the other hand, the inherently superior 
bargaining position of the mortgagee and potential for oppressive conduct 
has led most courts to examine such transactions with the strictest scru­
tiny for evidence of overreaching or, in  some cases, even to apply a pre­
sumption of fraud that the mortgage e  must rebut.61 
Once again, however, important distinctions exist between the deed 
absolute and section 9-505(2). The most obvious is that the deed absolute 
requires affirmative participation by the d ebtor, who must execute a deed 
55. 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 11 469 (rev. ed. 1987); 10 G. 
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 5160, at 133 (J. 
Grimes repl. ed. 1957). 
56. IV AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.178, at 427 (A. Casner ed. 1952); G. THOMP· 
SON, supra note 55, § 5160, at 132. 
57. See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 55, 11 469, at 37-348; G. THOMPSON, supra 
note 54, § 5162, at 139 (at common law there was no deficiency under strict foreclosure 
unless court ordered a public sale); IV AMERICAN LAw or PROPERTY, supra note 56, §§ 
16.178-79, at 429-33 (in England, suit on underlying obligation after foreclosure reopens 
for�closure and allows redemption; opposite rule said to apply in America but courts have 
spht). 
58. IV AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 56, § 16.179, at 431-32; R. POWELL & P. 
ROHAN, supra note 55, 11 469, at 37-346-47; G. THOMPSON, supra note 55, § 5160, at 134-35· 
59. IV AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 56, § 16.63, at 11 7-18; R. POWELL & P. 
ROHAN, supra note 55, 11 469.1 [1], at 37-348-49; Kelley, Foreclosure by Contract: Deeds in 
Lieu of Foreclosure in Missouri, 56 UMKC L. REV. 633 (1988). 
5o. R. PowELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 55 11 469.1 (1] at 37-349· Kelley supra note 
59, at 640-42. ' 
' ' ' 
at 6::.
· R. PowELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 55, 11 469.1(1], at 37-349; Kelley, supra note 59, 
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in order to give up his equity. Section 9-505(2), on the other hand, is 
satisfied if the debtor merely remains silent. Thus, section 9-505(2) can 
operate essentially unilaterally. Moreover, the creditor who properly 
utilizes section 9-505(2) eliminates junior lienors; this is not true of the 
deed absolute and, indeed, may preclude its use. 82 
The personal property analogue to the Code was, as previously noted, 
in the area of conditional sales. At common law, the simple act of repos­
session barred the action on the debt by the doctrine of election.68 The 
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, while eschewing the election doctrine 
generally,6' a llowed the seller to retain the goods "as his own property" 
without obligation to the buyer and in discharge of all the buyer's obliga­
tions, 811 unless the seller was subject to compulsory resale68 or the buyer 
properly demanded resale within ten days of repossession.87 
Unlike the Code, the prior uniform rule required no affirmative ac­
tion by the secured party; presumably he could simply make a subjective 
decision at any time after the debtor's ten-day grace period for redemp­
tion68 or demand for sale had passed. For other reasons, however, it seems 
likely that the "strict foreclosure" option was a more attractive one under 
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA) than under the UCC. To be­
gin with, the highly regulated resale procedure under the UCSA was 
fraught with potential for technical defects and subsequent litigation. 
Thus, rather than take the steps necessary to preserve his deficiency 
rights, a seller might very well have preferred to keep the goods under 
section 23 and thereafter make whatever private disposition he could. 
This, in turn, suggests a further reason why section 9-505(2) is often 
an unrealistic remedy. By definition, the secured party under the UCSA 
was almost invariably a dealer; thus he would have at least the facilities 
for sales of used goods, if not an eager market. The UCC, of course, gov­
erns loan as well as sales transactions (or leases that are functionally se­
curity transactions69) and it would obviously be the unusual case in which 
a lender would wish to retain the goods instead of selling them. Indeed, at 
least one well-known case, Reeves v. Foutz and Tanner, Inc.,70 held that 
section 9-505(2) cannot be used by a secured party who intends to resell 
goods in the ordinary course of business, but rather that any subsequent 
62. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 55, �· 469.1 [4], at 37-353; Kelley, supra note 
59, at 665-68. 
63. For a discussion of the doctrine of election, see supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
64. Section 24 allowed the seller to sue for deficiency after repossession if a public sale 
had been made. U.C.S.A. § 24 (1918). 
65. Id. § 23. 
66. Id. § 1 9; see supra note 45. 
67. U.C.S.A. § 20 (1918). The demand had to be written, delivered personally or by 
registered mail, and served within IO days of the retaking. Upon receipt of the demand, the 
seller was required to sell within 30 days at public auction. Id. §§ 1 9-20. 
68. Id. § 18. 
69. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) ( 1 987) ("security interest" includes leases intended as 
security). 
70. 94 N.M. 760, 617 P.2d 149 ( 1980). 
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sale is subject to section 9-504 and the debtor must be paid over any 
surplus. If section 9-505(2) is limited to instances where the secured party 
keeps the collateral for its own use, then obviously the provision is a dead 
letter.11 
Thus, if section 9-505(2) were applied only literally, it would seem to 
be of very limited practical significance. The ordinary lender would be 
interested not in the collateral but in realizing as much cash as possible to 
apply to the debt, and would therefore sell it. If other courts follow 
Reeves, even purchase-money sellers will be  unlikely to make the election 
to retain, since they, too, would ordinarily not be interested in personal 
use of the collateral. Even if the rationale of Reeves is rejected, however, 
the mandatory delay in section 9-505(2) will often make it unattractive, 
because the secured party will not want to risk further depreciation of the 
collateral or market fluctuations. 
Finally, and most importantly, with tangible personal property it will 
be the unusual case where there is any appreciable equity in the collat­
eral; the rapidity with which most collateral will depreciate almost guar­
antees a deficiency. This fact creates an overwhelming incentive to resell 
and sue for the remaining debt.72 Only where the collateral is accounts, 
chattel paper, instruments (subject to separate default rules in section 9-
50211), investment securities, precious metals, jewelry, or unique goods 
71. The facts of Reeves are fairly extreme. The debtors were semi-illiterate Navajo 
Indians; the secured party was a pawnbroker who used § 9-505(2) as a fairly heavy-handed 
means of depriving the debtors of the surplus value of the jewelry they pawned. It is no 
surprise that the court wished to prevent a w indfal l; however, a blanket holding that § 9-
505(2) can never be used by one who intends to r esel l  is an overly broad means to accom­
plish this. A more appropriate device would b e  to find a violation of the secured party's 
implied duty of good faith under § 1-203, rendering the surplus recoverable by the debtors 
under § 9-507(1) or § 1-103. Cf. G. GILMORE, supra note 21, § 44.3, at 1226-27: 
Now what is to happen when a secured party makes a proposal to retain, say, a 
million dollars' worth of collateral in satisfaction of a hundred-thousand-dollar 
debt-or a thousand dollars' worth of collateral in satisfaction of hundred-dollar 
debt-and, through oversight in the million-dollar case or ignorance in the thou­
sand-dollar case, no one who is qualified to object does so within the statutory 
time limits? The courts will do what they a lways have done and a lways will do. 
If fraud is al leged by someone who has standing to complain of it, the allegation 
will be inqui red into. If the fraud is proved, the offending transaction wil l  be set 
aside and the court will devise an appropriate remedy. 
72. Gilmore notes that the demand for a deficiency was the death knell of both the 
real estate strict foreclosure action and the conditional sel ler's election of remedies. G. GIL­
MORE, supra note 21, § 44.3, at 1221. 
73. See U.C.C. § 9-502 (1987): 
(1} When so agreed and in any event on default  the secured party is entitled 
t� notify an account debtor or the obligor on a n  instrument to make payment to 
him whether or not the assignor was theretofore making collections o n  the col­
lateral, and also to take control of any p r oceeds to which he is entitled under 
Section 9- 306. 
(2) A secured party who by agreement is entitled to charge back uncol lected 
collateral or otherwise to full or limited r ecourse against the debtor and who 
undertak�s to collect from the account debtors or obligors must proceed in a commercially reasonable manner and may deduct his reasonable expe nses of re-
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would there likely be even a rough equivalency between the value of the 
collateral and the debt owed. Since only such equivalency would make 
section 9-505(2) appealing, its voluntary use would seem severely 
circumscribed. 
But, of course, section 9-505(2) has, as I have already discussed, not 
been limited to the secured party's option. Its involuntary imposition by 
courts against creditors has assumed a position of far greater prominence 
than its occasional voluntary election. I now turn to an analysis of those 
cases. 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 9-505(2) 
As previously discussed, courts faced with violations of the resale 
provisions of section 9-504 have fashioned three disparate responses to 
the problem: The absolute bar rule, the rebuttable presumption rule, and 
the damages only rule. 74 A similar pattern has emerged in cases where the 
debtor's grievance is not defective notice of resale but, rather, either de­
lay in or failure to sell. In these cases, section 9-505(2) has frequently 
been invoked by debtors asserting an implied agreement by the secured 
party to retain the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt. The result of 
such a finding would be the loss of a right to a deficiency judgment. Just 
as with section 9-504, three distinct views have emerged. One extreme I 
characterize as the "delay is enough" cases: An unreasonable delay in dis­
posing of the collateral will be deemed an implied retention in satisfac­
tion of the debt.71 The intermediate view I call the "delay plus facts" 
cases: Delay alone will not cause the imposition of section 9-505(2), but 
may be coupled with other facts that collectively evince an implied agree­
ment to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.76 At the other 
extreme are the "damages only" cases: Section 9-505(2) is triggered only 
by an affirmative election of the secured party and will not be deemed to 
apply by implication. These courts limit the debtor to a set�off for dam­
ages under section 9-507.77 I discuss representative cases from each group. 
alization from the collections. If the security agreement secures an indebtedness, 
the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless other­
wise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But, if the underlying trans­
action was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any 
surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreements so provides. 
74. For a discussion of these rules, see supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text. 
75. For a discussion of the "delay is enough" cases, see infra notes 78-98 and accompa­
nying text. 
76. For a discussion of the "delay plus facts" cases, see infra notes 99·134 and accom­
panying text. 
77. For a discussion of the "damages only" cases, see infra notes 135-46 and accompa­
nying text. 
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This article began with a brief discussion of Millican v. Turner,1• a 
good example of the harshness that the "involuntary strict foreclosure" 
doctrine can visit upon a secured party and the lack of profound court 
analysis that these cases often evidence. Factually, the result in the case 
seems almost outrageous, at least from the perspective of the secured 
party. To begin with, the collateral had apparently been abandoned by 
the debtor and was in terrible condition at the time of repossession.78 The 
facts suggest that Millican could probably not have sold the car without 
first making a substantial investment in its refurbishing, an investment 
which the UCC certainly sanctions but does not ordinarily demand.90 
Moreover, the denial of a deficiency judgment to Millican placed him in a 
worse position than many purchase-money sellers, since he had been 
forced by the assignee of the contract to repurchase it.81 Thus, Millican 
lost not simply the value of the goods sold, but his cash as well. Under 
those circumstances, to deprive him of any chance for a d eficiency judg­
ment merely because of a delay in acting-something seemingly beyond 
his control, to a large extent-is using a cannon to kill the proverbial 
gnat. There is no evidence in the opinion either of overreaching by Milli­
can or of any prejudice to Turner by the delay in filing suit after the 
contract (and car) were reassigned to Millican. 
This last point also illustrates why the imposition of involuntarY 
strict foreclosure upon Millican was the sole avenue for Turner's relief. 
Applied literally, the UCC would give Turner only damages for the delay 
under section 9-507(1), and it is highly unlikely under the facts that any 
could be proved. Lacking a direct means for policing Millican's supposed 
misconduct, the court simply looked to section 9-505(2). In so doing, how­
ever, the court acknowledged neither textual nor policy difficulties with 
its analysis. Rather, to the court the issue was simple: "[U]nder what cir­
cumstances may a creditor who has repossessed collateral be deemed to 
have retained that collateral in satisfaction of the debt it secures."82 After 
78. 503 So. 2d 289 (Miss. 1987); see supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. 
79. Millican, 503 So. 2d at 290. 
80. Under § 9-504, the collateral may be sold "in. its then <!ondition or following any 
commercially reasonable preparation or processing." U.C.C. § 9-504(1) ( 1987).  To be sure, 
there are a number of opinions that have suggested that to act "commercially reasonably" 
the secured party may be required to make certain repairs prior to sale. A well-known exarn· 
pie is Liberty Nat'! Bank & Trust v. Acme Tool Div. of Rucker Co., 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 
1�76); see generally Burke, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey--Secured Trans_a�­
tions, 32 Bus. LAw. 1133, 1161-62 (1977) (discussing cases on both sides of the issue). Milli­
can, however, seems an unlikely candidate for the imposition of such a requirement. Give� 
the low value of the collateral after default--a car sold at least twice previously and est•· 
mated � be wor�h $800.00-the cost of repair seems clearly disproportionate to the incre­
mental mcrease m the potential sales price. 
81. Millican, 503 So. 2d at 290. 
82· Id. at 291 .  Of course, in phrasing the issue in that manner (particularly by the use 0� the "deemed to" language), the court fairly clearly telegraphs the answer it intends to 
give. 
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citing part of the text of section 9-505(2), the court noted briefly the split 
of authority on the issue and then, without further explanation, an­
nounced its adoption of the "majority position": 
[W]hen a creditor who has repossessed collateral retains it for an un­
reasonably long period without disposing of it, he is deemed to have 
retained the collateral in satisfaction of the debt which it secures and is 
thus precluded from suing o n  the note, regardless of whether he has 
notified the debtor that he is so retaining the collateral. What consti­
tutes an unreasonable delay is a question for the trier of fact.83 
The court did not, however, mention even in passing the debtor's right to 
damages under section 9-507(1) as a possible alternative remedy. Nor did 
it pause, even for a second, and reflect upon whether such a holding 
makes any sense from a policy perspective in light of the lack of any sug­
gestion of bad faith by Millican or injury to Turner. 
Rather, the court posed only one simple question to be answered 
upon remand, that is, whether Millican's retention of the car without dis­
position84 for a period of six months after reassignment of the contract 
was an unreasonably long period. This determination, the court sug­
gested, would depend upon "the types of collateral, how rapidly it depre­
ciates, the market for such collateral, and other relevant circumstances."86 
In light of the realities of Article 9 litigation and the all-or-nothing out­
come that necessarily accompanies the court's legal holding, the prudent 
creditor would seem to have but one rational course: settle for whatever 
pittance he can get before trial on remand, and retreat to lick his wounds. 
This lack of concern for either textual integrity or sound policy has, 
unfortunately, characterized many of the "delay is enough" cases. Indeed, 
the first reported case that would have been governed by the UCC, Brad­
ford v. Lindsey Chevrolet Company,88 did not bother to cite section 9-
505(2) at all. The case bears some striking similarities to Millican: A car, 
purchased by a minor from Lindsey Chevrolet under a conditional sales 
contract in July 1965, was wrecked in November of the same year. No 
further payments were made, 87 and the finance company to which the 
contract had been sold repossessed the car and transferred the car and 
contract back to Lindsey Chevrolet in April 1966, after Lindsey had satis­
fied its repurchase obligation. Lindsey's only attempt at collection was 
instituting suit against Bradford, who guaranteed the contract, in July 
1966. Bradford's sole defense was that the repossession of the automobile 
was a "waiver" of the right to collect on the debt.88 
83. Id. 
84. Id. The court never addressed the issue of whether the efforts Millican made to 
sell the car during the interim met the standards of commercial reasonableness. Presu�a­
bly, it deemed this irrelevant to an inquiry under § 9-505(2), making delay the only sahent 
issue. 
85. Id. 
86. 117  Ga. App. 781, 161 S.E.2d 904 (1968). 
87. Id. One assumes that the car was uninsured. 
88. 1 1 7  Ga. App. at 783, 161 S.E.2d at 906. As previously noted, the common law 
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In reversing a judgment n.o.v. for Lindsey Chevrolet, the court said 
only the following: 
Irrespective of whether the law prior to the Georgia Uniform Com­
mercial Code . . . or the Commercial Code itself applies here, the result 
is the same. See § 109 A-9-501 et seq. of the Georgia Uniform Commer­
cial Code. The action of the holder in legally repossessing the security 
under a conditional sales contract, the retention of the same without 
sale and without excuse for not selling, and without demand for pay­
ment of the contract, for a period of approximately 50 days before suit 
on the contract and for over 16 months from the time of filing suit to 
the time of trial, constituted a rescission and satisfaction of the con­
tract and no recovery could be had thereon.•• 
While the common law doctrine of election of remedies would undoubt­
edly support this result, the court offered no explanation of how the pro­
visions of part 5 of the UCC could be construed in the same fashion. The 
most that can be said is that the court apparently drew upon a perceived 
distinction between "accord and satisfaction" and "rescission and satis­
faction," the term it employed in Bradford.'0 
doctrine of election of remedies would clearly yield this result; however the rule was differ­
ent under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
The court does not discuss which law pertained in Georgia prior to its adoption of the UCC 
in 1962. 
89. 117 Ga. App. at 783, 161 S.E.2d at 906. · 
90. A slightly earlier case dealing with a defective sale, Braswell v. American Nat'! 
Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968), sheds further light on the court's meaning 
and suggests that it was basing its rationale more on common law principles than on invol­
untary strict foreclosure. In Braswell, the debtor claimed that the secured party's failure to 
give him notice of a public sale barred a deficiency judgment, and the court agreed. In �he 
course of the opinion, however, the court noted that the Code expressly requires affirmative 
action by the secured party to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, and provides 
only a right to damages for noncompliance with the notice of sale provisions. 117  Ga. App. 
at 701, 161 S.E.2d at 422. However, the court simply aligned itself with the "majority" of 
courts that had found strict compliance with Part 5 a condition precedent to recovery of a 
deficiency. Id. 
Alternatively, the court raised but did not elaborate on the issue of accord and satisfac­
tion. It stated merely that since the repossession was lawful, the taking could not constitute 
accord and satisfaction, but that this did not preclude a finding that the underlying contract 
had been rescinded. Id. Presumably, it is this notion of implied rescission that formed the 
basis of the decision in Bradford. 
It is not, however, clear how the court could apply an accord and satisfaction analysis to 
such a case in any event, since this presupposes both mutual consent and new consideration. 
See supra note 9. Indeed the same court, in a contemporaneous opinion, rejected a debtor'.s 
argument that his agreement to allow repossession only on condition of his release consti­
tute
� an accord and satisfaction. The court stated that since the right to repossess. 
was 
pr�vided both by the security agreement and by § 9-503 of the UCC, there was no consider­
ation for an accord and satisfaction. Barnes v. Reliable Tractor Co., 1 1 7  Ga. App. 777, 161 
S.E.2d 918 ( 1968). 
In any event, the accord and satisfaction or rescission theories have generally not been 
e�br�ced by later courts, although there is the occasional exception. See, e.g. , Ace Parts & 
�istrib., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 146 Ga. App. 4, 245 S.E.2d 314 (1978) (discussing "nova· 
tion of satisfaction" but holding against debtor on facts). As previously noted, the Millican 
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While many cases have reached the same result as Millican,91 that 
court's description of the "delay is enough" approach as the majority rule 
is questionable. At least as many courts appear to have embraced the 
"delay plus facts" analysis discussed in the next section. What is clear, 
however, is that there is no necessary trend away from this simplistic ap­
proach. Indeed, the most recent state high court to consider the issue, the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota, seems to have taken this tack. In Wang 
v. Wang,93 the collateral (motor vehicles) was repossessed by the secured 
party in July 1980. In December 1984, after a trial on the underlying debt 
and pending appeal, the secured party sold the collateral to himself at an 
"auction" attended only by himself and his lawyer. The sale price was 
$100.00; testimony indicated a value of approximately $30,000.00. In a 
subsequent action against the debtor and guarantor for a deficiency, the 
court reversed a verdict for the secured party. The court stated that not­
withstanding the failure of the secured party to give notice under section 
9-505(2) ,  "under the facts of this case [the secured party's] actions oper­
ated as a de facto election of strict foreclosure. "93 
Before turning to the "delay plus facts" cases, one other note is in 
order. There is yet another approach to the delay problem that reaches 
the same basic result as Millican and like cases but, perhaps, shows 
somewhat greater concern for the textual integrity of the UCC. An illus­
trative case is Alamosa National Bank v. San Luis Valley Grain Grow­
ers, Inc. 94 There, the secured party repossessed its personal property 
collateral and was still in possession at the time of trial, some 17 months 
later. The trial court held that this was an implied election to retain in 
court expressly rejected the accord and satisfaction theory. See supra note 9. 
91 .  See, e.g. ,  Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1989) (alternative 
holding); In re Myers, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1420 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1976); Schultz v. Dela­
ware Trust Co., 360 A.2d 576 (Del. Super. 1976); Haufier v. Ardinger, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
893 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (erroneously applies 603 price rule to § 9-505(2)); Northern Fin. 
Corp. v. C hatwood Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 674 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Farmer's 
State Bank v. Ballew, 626 P.2d 337 (Okla. App. 1981) (dictum); Texas Nat'l Bank v. Karnes, 
711 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App. 1986) (tort liability imposed in addition to forfeiture of defi­
ciency); Service Chevrolet, Inc. v. Sparks, 99 Wash. 2d 199, 660 P.2d 760 (1983); Swanson v. 
May, 40 Wash. App. 148, 697 P.2d 1013 ( 1985) (commercial transaction).  
92. 440 N.W.2d 740 (S.D. 1989). 
93. Id. at 746. Wang is one of a number of cases that are difficult to classify because of 
the lack of detail and precision in the court's analysis. The court shows no awareness of the 
split of authority nationally and cites only a prior case, First Bank v. Haberer Dairy & Farm 
Equipment, 4 1 2  N.W.2d 866 (S.D. 1987), which refused to apply involuntary strict foreclo­
sure because the secured party sued on the debt, attempted to sell the collateral, and n.oti­fied the debtors that it was not accepting the collateral in full satisfaction. The only sahent 
facts cited in Wang to distinguish Haberer, however, were the longer delays in filing suit 
and making the sale. Thus, the court does not appear to be basing its determination of 
"intent" upon anything other than temporal factors. 
Of course, the case could easily have been disposed of on the basis of the rebuttable 
Presumption rule that the court adopted for violations of § 9-504. See supra notes 34-39 and 
accompanying text. For procedural reasons, however, the court chose to allow the jury ver­
dict on this issue to stand. 
94. 756 P.2d 1022 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 
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satisfaction under section 9-505(2).911 The appellate court reversed on this 
basis, holding in a case of first impression that section 9-505(2) is trig­
gered only where the secured party gives the prescribed notice. The court 
then, however, analogized unreasonable retention of collateral to failure 
to give notice, and decided that the rebuttable presumption rule that Col­
orado had adopted with respect to the latter should be applied: 
[W}e hold that a secured party in possession of the collateral who 
neither disposes of it, nor elects in writing to retain it in satisfaction of 
the obligation and is determined to have retained the collateral in a 
commercially unreasonable manner, must overcome the presumption 
that the value of the collateral equals the amount of the debt and un­
less rebutted, the obligation of the debtor has been satisfied." 
Finding support for the trial court's decision that the length of the delay 
was unreasonable, the court remanded for determination of  whether the 
creditor could rebut the presumption. 87 
Since there will frequently be extensive delay in disposition of the 
collateral, the Alamosa National Bank approach offers courts a means for 
denying a deficiency without encountering the technical difficulties in ap­
plying section 9-505(2). While it is too early to tell whether other courts 
will follow suit, the development of the law in this area bears watching.9' 
B. "Delay Plus Facts" Cases 
Although a number of jurisdictions have now embraced the "delay 
plus facts" approach, perhaps the most fully developed line of authority 
for illustrative purposes comes from Texas. The leading case is Tanen· 
baum u. Economics Laboratory, Inc.89 The opinion is brief and, in some 
respects, confusing. The secured party, Economics Laboratory, sold com­
?1ercial laundry equipment to the debtor, Tanenbaum, taking a security 
interest by virtue of two conditional sales contracts.100 The equipment 
was nonfunctional, and after two years Tanenbaum tendered the equip· 
ment to Economics, asking that his account be fully credited. The secured 
Part� repossessed, but deeming repair of the equipment prohibitively ex· 
pensive, scrapped it and sued for a deficiency. Tanenbaum received no 
notice prior to this action.101 The trial court entered a summary judgment 
for the debtor on the basis that the secured party's action in retaining the 
collateral barred the recovery of a deficiency. The Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals, however, reversed that decision, holding that the rebuttable pre-
95. Id. at 1026. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1027. The court also noted that the debtor could recover damages under § 9-
507(1) to the extent they could be proved. Id. at 1026. 
98. As of this writing, Alamosa National Bank has been followed in only one case 
(from the same court), Tajalli v. Gharibi, 758 P.2d 190 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). 
99· 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982), noted in 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 605 (1982)· 14 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 513 (1983). 
' 
100. Tanenbaum, 628 S.W.2d at 770. 
101. Id. 
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sumption rule102 under section 9-504 should be applied where the secured 
creditor retains the collateral with neither disposition under section 9-504 
nor proposal to retain under section 9-505(2), but merely gives credit for 
the value of the collateral.101 The effect, of course, was still to deny the 
deficiency judgment unless the secured party could overcome the pre­
sumption, but presumably this was a more palatable alternative than be­
ing kicked out of court altogether by invocation of the involuntary strict 
foreclosure doctrine. 
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and instituted the trial court's 
judgment. 10' In its view, section 9-504 and 9-505 were conceived as com­
plete alternatives: The legislative intent was to force the creditor to make 
"an election to either sell the repossessed collateral pursuant to section 9-
504 or to retain the collateral in complete satisfaction of the debt pursu­
ant to section 9-505."1011 In so doing, the court rejected the rebuttable 
presumption rule and adopted the absolute bar rule as the law of 
Texas. 106 
On the issue of the secured party's retention in the case at hand, 
though, the court's holding was fairly narrow. Rather than simply adopt­
ing the implied strict foreclosure principle wholesale, the court limited 
the result to the circumstances of the cause: "By destroying the collateral 
[Economics Laboratory] elected to be governed by section 9-505, and 
therefore is not entitled to a deficiency judgment. "107 
Tanenbaum was a short and strange opinion that evinced little un­
derstanding of the subtleties of the 9-505(2) issue. Indeed, it is not at all 
clear that the court was basing the result solely on section 9-505(2), given 
its express holding that a creditor who disposes of collateral under section 
9-504 must give notice or forfeit his deficiency rights. 101 It was at least 
possible, though, that Tanenbaum could be read as imposing a 9-505(2) 
"election" only on a secured party who destroys the collateral, otherwise 
confining the statute to its literal place in the statutory scheme. 
Predictably, that has not consistently been the course of subsequent 
cases. Rather, lower courts have read Tanenbaum as sanctioning the in­
voluntary strict foreclosure doctrine, so long as facts, of variable degrees 
102. Economics Lab., Inc. v. Tanenbaum, 620 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1981), rev'd, 628 
S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982). For an explanation of the rebuttable presumption rule, see supra 
notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
103. Id. at 841. 
104. Tanenbaum, 628 S.W.2d at 772. 
105. Id. at 771-72. 
106. Id. at 772 (in order for creditor to sue for deficiency after disposition of the col­
lateral in a commercially reasonable manner, he must comply with notice requirements of § 
9-504). 
107. Id. (emphasis added). 
108. Id. The court might have viewed scrapping the collateral as a form of "disposi­
tion" under section 9-504(3), thus providing an alternative basis for its decision. In any 
event, it seems that this part of the opinion is basically surplusage to the core holding and 
serves mainly to announce prospectively the adoption of the absolute bar rule under § 9-504. 
For further discussion of the ambiguities in the opinion, see 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 605, 628-33 
(1982). 
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of strength, indicate an intent on the part of the secured party to have 
elected to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. 109 
For example, in Burton u. National Bank of Commerce of Dallas,110 
the debtor alleged that, after default, he was induced to deliver the collat­
eral (a truck) voluntarily to a bank officer by virtue of a representation 
that the bank had found a buyer for the truck who would extinguish the 
debt. The debtor argued waiver, estoppel, and accord and satisfaction in 
defense of the deficiency action.11 1  In reversing a verdict for the secured 
party, the court placed the case within the rule of Tanenbaum: Jury find­
ings for the debtor on the issues of waiver and estoppel "conclusively es­
tablish an election by bank to take the collateral in satisfaction of 
Burton's debt, and . . .  became final and irrevocable upon Burton's deliv­
ery of the collateral security to the bank. "1 12 
The secured party fared better in Piney Point Investment Corpora­
tion u. Photo Design, Inc. ,113 a case involving delay in disposition. The 
secured parties sold a graphic design business to the debtors, reserving a 
security interest in the assets to secure a purchase money note. After de­
fault, the secured parties repossessed the business on February 1, 1982, 
and on March 30 their attorney notified the debtors by letter that a pri­
vate sale would be made on or after April 15, 1982.1 14 No sale was made 
at that time, though, because the secured parties reestablished the busi­
ness. Two assetsm were sold in September 1982 to meet expenses, but no 
other sales had been made at the time of trial, which occurred two years 
after repossession, nor were any efforts to have such a sale made. 
Nonetheless, the court rejected the debtor's implied strict foreclosure 
argument. 118 It read Tanenbaum narrowly as imposing the forfeiture of 
the deficiency because the destruction of the collateral had deprived the 
debtor of any opportunity to rebut the creditor's subjective valuation of 
the collateral. In Piney Point, however, the secured parties gave notice of 
the sale, and the property was at all times available for appraisal.117 Thus, 
the court was unwilling to apply section 9-505(2), since the secured par­
ties had given express notice of sale. According to the court, the mere fact 
that the secured parties "repossessed the equipment and may have re­
mained in possession of a substantial part of it, does not, standing alone, 
109. Prior to Tanenbaum, the only reported Texas appellate court case o n  the issue 
had held that § 9-505(2) was triggered only by express notice. See Roylex, Inc. v. E. F. 
Johnson Co., 617 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 98 1 )  (disapproved in Tanenbaum). 
110. 679 S.W.2d 1 1 5  (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). 
111. Id. at 1 16. 
112. Id. at 119. Candidly, it must be said that the court's opinion on § 9-505(2) is at be�t vague and c�nfusing; indeed, it is not clear w hether the debtor was given notice of the �ltimate sale (which does seem to have been made) and whether any m aterial delay in mak· mg the sale occurred. 
113. 691 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
114. Id. This compl ied with the requirements o f § 9-504(3) for private sales. 
115. No other identification of the property sold was made. Id. at 769. 
116. Id. at 770. 
117. Id. at 769. 
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constitute an election t o  retain the collateral i n  full satisfaction of the 
indebtedness. "111 
A more conventional "delay plus facts" approach was taken in In re 
Boyd.1 111 There, the secured party repossessed, after default, a boat, mo­
tor, and trailer. Two months later, the debtor filed his petition in bank­
ruptcy. 120 In response to the bank's motion to lift the automatic stay, the 
court held that the bank had taken the collateral in satisfaction of the 
debt. Although no section 9-505(2) notice had been given, the debtor al­
leged (and the court believed) that he had seen bank personnel using the 
boat. The court concluded that the bank's failure to sell the boat within a 
reasonable time, coupled with its conversion of the boat to its own use, 
resulted in an election to satisfy the debt under section 9-505. m 
An even broader interpretation of Tanenbaum is found in Texas Na­
tional Bank v. Karnes, 121 which appears to align itself with the "delay is 
enough" line of cases. There, the bank repossessed a van owned by one of 
the debtors, David Karnes (a minor), and attempted to set off the balance 
of the note against a savings account of his parents, one of whom (Alice) 
was a co-signor of his note. The parents thereafter sued the bank for 
"conversion" of the credit balance from their account and for exemplary 
damages. At the time of trial, five years later, for unexplained reasons, 
the van had never been sold. 118 
In an opinion that should have a rather jarring effect on secured 
lenders, the court held that the delay in disposition of the collateral 
barred a deficiency by operation of law and upheld an award of exem­
plary damages (though reducing them from $50,000 to $20,000).114 On the 
issue of involuntary strict foreclosure, the court's pronouncements were 
exceedingly brief: 
If the bank, or any secured creditor, retains collateral for the length of 
time, as was done in this case, such secured creditor is not entitled to 
recover deficiencies. Since the bank retained the collateral, it, by opera· 
tion of law, elected to take the collateral in full satisfaction of the 
debt.ua 
Thus, the court seemed to require nothing beyond excessive delay to trig­
ger section 9-505(2). 
On its facts, this is probably unremarkable; five years is a long time, 
1 18. Id. at 770. Moreover, the court upheld the award of a deficiency judgment. Al­
though the failure to sell the collateral was not commercially reasonable, the secured parties 
met the burden of proving that the value of the collateral was less than the debt, and the 
debtor received full credit for that amount. Id. 
1 19. 73 Bankr. 122 (N.D. Tex. 1987). 
120. Id. at 124. 
121. Id. at 124-25. It might be noted that the bankruptcy judge in Boyd did not cite 
Tanenbaum. 
122. 711  S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). 
123. Id. at 392. 
124. Id. at 396. 
125. Id. at 392 (citing Tanenbaum). 
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and the bank curiously offered no explanation for its failure to act. More 
ominous, though, was the court's holding on tort liability. On the bases 
that (1) the van was repossessed in May 1979; (2) $3,474.41 was deducted 
from the account of the parents, Dewey and Alice, in July 1979; (3) the 
parents learned of the deduction in December 1979; and (4) the bank had 
possession of the van at trial, in July 1984, the court reached this 
conclusion: 
We hold the following to be torts, or certainly of a tortious nature, 
on the part of the bank: 
1. In failing to make a reasonable disposition of the collateral; 
2. In keeping possession of the collateral beyond a reasonable time; 
3. In taking or converting the money out of the savings account 
after losing its right to offset; 
4. In failing to timely notify Dewey and Alice of the deduction from 
their savings account; 
5. In concealing the fact from Dewey and Alice that the bank had 
deducted from their savings the sum of $3,474.41 for the period of time 
from July, 1979, to December, 1979; 
6. In failing to return the certificate of title to the van while having 
possession of the van from May, 1979, to July, 1984; and, 
7. In failing to establish the value of the collateral in a commer­
cially reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after repossess­
ing the same. 128 
The court concluded that each of these acts or omissions was a separate 
and independent tort, and that cumulatively the actions justified the im­
position of exemplary damages.127 
In deeming a commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral 
under article 9 to be a new species of tort, Karnes is certainly a case that 
bears watching, although in this respect it may fit more comfortably 
within the burgeoning field of lender liability.118 That, however, is beyond 
the scope of this article. The more immediate question is whether Karnes 
foreshadows a shift among lower Texas courts towards an expansive view 
of Tanenbaum's involuntary strict foreclosure theory. 
In any event, Texas is far from the only jurisdiction to embrace the 
"delay plus facts" interpretation of section 9-505(2). A substantial num­
ber of cases have held, at least in effect, that some facts evidencing "in­
tent" to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt must augment the 
proof of mere delay before section 9-505(2) can be involuntarily im­
posed.129 Indeed, it seems likely that this (like the rebuttable presump-
126. Id. at 396. 
127. Id. at 396-97. 
128. See generally Note, The Doctrine of Lender Liability, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 85 
(1988); Comment, Lender Liability: Good Faith and Demand Notes, 64 TUL. L. REV. 187 
(1989). 
129. In addition to the Texas cases already cited, see United States v. Excellair, Inc., 
637 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Colo. 1986); In re Deephouse Equip. Co., 38 Bankr. 400 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 1984) (useful survey of three-part split in case law); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. 
Priority Elec. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Moran v. Holman, 514 P.2d 817 
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tion rule under section 9-504) will become, if it is not already, the 
"majority" rule, if for no other reason than the appeal that compromise 
or intermediate positions always have for courts. 
Perhaps most noteworthy is that adoption of the "delay plus facts" 
approach is much more likely to augur well for the secured party, since 
the court may conclude that the debtor has not marshalled sufficient 
proof to establish the necessary (and, of course, fictitious) "intent." A 
well reasoned case in point is Nelson u. Armstrong.180 Armstrong, an 
equipment dealer, repossessed a tractor after default and, pursuant to a 
stipulation with Nelson made four and one-half m onths thereafter, sold 
the equipment. Nelson sued Armstrong for fraudulent misrepresentation, 
and Armstrong counterclaimed for a deficiency judgment.181 The trial 
court awarded Nelson damages and denied the deficiency on, inter alia, 
the grounds that Armstrong's delay in selling barred recovery under sec­
tion 9-505(2). 182 
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed on the issue of implied retention. 
The court refused, however, to hold that section 9-505(2) applies only 
where the statutory proposal is made. Rather, the court left open the pos­
sibility of involuntary strict foreclosure, preferring to base its conclusion 
on the weakness of the debtor's proof: 
While strict compliance with the written notice provision of [sec­
tion 9-505(2)] may not be essential where the debtor is claiming that 
the secured party has retained the collateral, we think that the creditor 
must in some way have manifested an intent to accept the collateral in 
full satisfaction of the debtor's obligation . . . . 
As we view it, [section 9-505(2)] is not a device for policing the 
conduct of secured parties vis-a-vis their debtors, but rather a statutory 
analogue to the common law concept of accord and satisfaction . . . . 
While the proverbial meeting of the minds is not essential under (sec­
tion 9-505(2)], a debtor seeking to avail himself of the statute's recipro­
cal protections must still establish that the secured party intended to 
retain the collateral in lieu of selling it for the debtor's account. 
The determination of what will sufficiently manifest a secured 
party's intent to retain collateral in satisfaction of the obligation must 
await development in the context of future cases. It is enough for the 
(Alaska 1973) (use of collateral by secured party as well as delay); ITT Terryphone Corp. v 
Modems Plus, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 710, 320 S.E.2d 784 (1984) (question of fact); Wisconics 
Eng'g, Inc. v. Fisher, 466 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Schmode's, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 219 
Neb. 205, 361 N. W.2d 557 ( 1985); Winters Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Saker, 66 Ohio App. 
2d 31, 419 N.E.2d 890 (1979); FDIC v. Tempest Fugat, H.L.I., Inc., 75 Or. App. 536, 707 
P.2d 81 ( 1985),  reu. denied, 300 Or. 546, 715 P.2d 93 (1986); Durhahl v. Bank of Casper, 718 
P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1986). See also Deutsche Credit Corp. v. Woodard, 719 S.W.2d 514 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1986) (fact question as to whether secured party agreed to accept surrender of collat­
eral in satisfaction of debt; § 9-505 not cited); First Nat'! Bank of Pa. v. Cole, 293 Pa. Super. 
791, 435 A.2d 1283 (1981) (assuming arguendo that implied election is possible under § 9-
505, no such evidence presented). 
130. 99 Idaho 422, 582 P.2d 1100 (1978). 
131. Id. at 425, 582 P.2d at 1 103. 
132. Id. 
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present to hold that Armstrong's mere failure to attempt resale of farm 
equipment for a period of four and a half months does not adequately 
manifest his intent to retain it. m 
The court's candid remark that section 9-505(2) is not a policing tool 
is telling, for clearly there is nothing in the history of the provision to 
suggest that the drafters envisioned it to operate in the fashion espoused 
by the debtor. 184 On the other hand, the refusal of the court to reject 
outright the implied application of section 9-505(2) may also evince an 
unstated uneasiness with the effectiveness of the express remedial provi­
sions of part 5 of article 9. That tension is clearly exposed in the final 
class of cases. 
C. "Damages Only" Cases 
While the courts of New York have not been uniform in their ap­
proach to section 9-505(2), perhaps the leading case nationally in re­
jecting involuntary strict foreclosure is S.M. Flickinger Company, Inc. v. 
18 Genesee Corporation.131 The plaintiff, Flickinger, subleased property 
to Genesee to operate a "Super Duper Food Market" and loaned it 
$230,000. Upon default, the plaintiff by agreement took possession of the 
store, fixtures, and inventory. It then sued for a judgment on the note.131 
The court found the defendants bound to their agreement regarding 
the disposition and valuation of the inventory. The agreement did not, 
however, address fixtures, and no attempt was made to dispose of them. 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that failure to 
comply with section 9-504 would require the secured party to prove the 
fair market value of the collateral and the resulting deficiency (the rebut­
table presumption approach).187 In so doing, however, the court rejected 
the position that section 9-505(2) could be imposed involuntarily: 
By its terms the statute mak�s the election to retain the collateral 
in full satisfaction and discharge of the debt optional with the creditor 
and it provides that the option is to be exercised by written notice to 
the debtor. There was no communication between the parties to this 
action, however, which may be construed as an election by the creditor 
to take the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt, and an election 
133. Id. at 430, 582 P.2d at 1 108. The court remanded, however, for determination of 
whether the delay rendered the ultimate sale commercially unreasonable and what legal 
effect the trial court's findings on this issue would have on Armstrong's deficiency rights. Id. 
at 432, 582 P.2d at 1 100. 
. 134. For a discussion of the history of § 9-505(2), see supra notes 50-53 and accompa­nying text. 
135. 71 A.D.2d 382, 423 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). Two earlier cases (one 
federal) took a different tack. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Priority Elec. Corp., 435 
F. Supp. 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) ("delay plus facts" case holding that creditor whose agent 
converted property and prevented resale was barred from deficiency)·  Northern Fin. Corp. 
v. Chatwood Coffee Shop, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 674 (N.Y. Sup: Ct. 1967) ("delay is 
enough" case). 
136. 18 Genesee, 71 A.D.2d at 383-84, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75. 
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should not be implied when the means for certainty are spelled out in 
the statute. The concern ,  of course, is that the creditor, having pro­
ceeded without notifying the debtor of his intention, may act to the 
debtor's disadvantage. But section 9-505 was not designed to protect 
the debtor from a wrongful sale . . . .  If the secured party fails to 
comply with the provisions of Article 9, the debtor may protect his 
rights by the remedies available pursuant to section 9-507. He may 
restrain or compel disposition of the collateral, or if the disposition has 
already occurred, he may charge the creditor with any loss occasioned 
by its unauthorized conduct. Neither the provisions nor the purposes of 
the Code require that plaintiff forfeit its entire claim, however, and the 
Code should not be interpreted to permit the uncertainty of a jury trial 
on that issue here. '88 
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18 Genesee thus states, in clear and forceful terms, a seemingly over­
powering textual rebuttal to the involuntary strict foreclosure doctrine. 
Its strength has been such that subsequent New York cases have consist­
ently followed it,139 and certainly a respectable number of other jurisdic­
tions have reached the same conclusion.140 Indeed, in a recent decision, 
Warnaco, Inc. v. Farkas,1·0 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit aligned itself with 18 Genesee. In Warnaco, the seller of a 
1 38. Id. at 384, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 76 {emphasis added). 
1 39 .  Bank of Boston Int'! of Miami v .  Arguello Tefel, 644 F. Supp. 1423 {E.D.N.Y. 
1986);  In re Emergency Beach Corp., 48 Bankr. 341 {S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hanam, B.V. v. Kittay, 
589 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Mitchell, 94 A.D.2d 971, 464 
N.Y.S.2d 96 (1983); Marine Midland Bank v. Connelly, 79 A.D.2d 1102, 435 N.Y.2d 850 
(1981) .  
140. See, e.g., Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F.2d 173 {1st Cir. 1989) {alternative 
holding); In re Amador, 596 F.2d 428 { 10th Cir. 1979); In re Nardone, 70 Bankr. 1010 {D. 
Mass. 1987); Fletcher v. Cobuzzi, 499 F. Supp. 694 {W.D. Pa. 1980); Everett v. Parts, Inc., 4 
Ark. App. 2 13, 628 S.W.2d 875 (1982); Florida First Nat'! Bank at Pensacola v. Martin, 449 
So. 2d 861 {Fla. Ct. App. 1984) {failure to give § 9-505(2) notice obliged secured party to sell 
under § 9-504); Ayares-Eisenberg-Perrine Datsun, Inc. v. Sun Bank, 455 So. 2d 525 {Fla. Ct. 
App. 1984); McCullough v. Mobiland, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 260, 228 S.E.2d 146 (1976); Com­
mercial Fin., Ltd. v. American Resources, Ltd., 6 Haw. App. 667, 737 P.2d 1120 (1987); 
Stensel v. Stensel, 63 Ill. App. 3d 639, 380 N.E.2d 526 (1978) {failure to give notice not § 9-
505(2) election); Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972); FDIC v. Air Atlantic, 
Inc., 389 Mass. 950, 452 N.E.2d 1 143 (1983); Priggen Steel Bldg. Co. v. Parsons, 350 Mass. 
62, 2 1 3  N.E.2d 252 (1966); Jones v.  Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 455, 228 N.W.2d 419 (1975) 
(dictum); American Parts Sys. v. T & T Automotive, Inc., 358 N.W.2d 674 {Minn. Ct. App. 
1984) {§ 9-505 applies only where statutory notice is given); Total Equip. Leasing Corp. v. 
LaRue Inv. Corp., 357 N.W.2d 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting implied application of § 
9-505); Stensvad v. Miners & Merchants Bank, 163 Mont. 409, 517 P.2d 715 (1973) (secured 
Party notifies debtors of intent to enforce security interest, debtors cannot rely upon § 9-505 
to contend that there is a "recision and satisfaction" of debt); Brownstein v. Fiberonics 
Indus., 1 10 N.J. Super. 43, 264 A.2d 262 ( 1970); Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest 
Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975); Winters Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Saker, 
66 Ohio App. 2d 31, 419 N.E.2d 890 ( 1 979) (secured party should be able to sue on debt 
without recourse against collateral); Farmers State Bank of Parkston v. Otten, 87 S.D. 161, 
204 N.W.2d 178 (1973); IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607 {Utah 1989) (dictum). Cf. 
Vogel v. Carolina Int'), Inc., 711 P.2d 708 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (unreasonable delay in send­
ing § 9-505(2) notice can give rise to damages in conversion). 
141. 872 F.2d 539 {2d Cir. 1989). 
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business licensed trademarks to the buyer, with the agreement that upon 
full payment the trademarks would be transferred for one dollar. The 
court analogized the arrangement to a lease of equipment with a nominal 
purchase option and held that the trademarks were obviously collateral. 
When the buyer defaulted, the seller terminated the licensing agreement, 
and the debtors claimed that this was a repossession that constituted ac­
ceptance in full satisfaction under section 9-505(2). 10 
The court of appeals, however, predicted that the courts of Connecti­
cut would reject the involuntary strict foreclosure doctrine of Millican v. 
Turner and follow 18 Genesee.as It stated its rationale as follows: 
We believe that [Millican and like cases] depart from the scheme 
of the UCC regarding repossessions of collateral and predict that Con­
necticut would not follow them. If, after repossession of collateral, a 
creditor does nothing it may be compelled by the debtor to make some 
disposition under section 9-507. Even if a debtor does not seek such an 
order, however, the creditor must deduct the value of the collateral at 
the time of repossession from the outstanding balance of the debt. In 
that scheme, there is no role for an extra-statutory rule that contem­
plates repossession of collateral in full satisfaction of the debt where 
the creditor fails to give the requisite notice and the value of repos­
sessed collateral is less than the debt. Such a rule is not needed to pro­
tect debtors because the value of the collateral must be deducted from 
the outstanding balance whether or not the creditor acts to dispose of 
the collateral. We therefore predict that Connecticut would not hold 
that Warnaco accepted the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.144 
It is difficult to fault the court's analysis in terms of statutory con­
struction. Given the prominence of the Second Circuit in commercial 
matters, it is quite possible that this decision will be an influential one. 
Nonetheless, while I largely agree with the court's statutory analysis, I 
believe that its conclusion falls short of a workable solution to the overall 
P
.
roblem of creditor inaction. In effect, the 18 Genesee/Warnaco approach 
simply shifts the dispute to another battlefield, that of commercially rea­
sonable disposition under section 9-504. The court in Warnaco implicitly 
admitted as much, as it ultimately remanded the case for fact findings on 
that question, noting the split of authority as to the appropriate sanction 
for a "misbehaving creditor."14& 
As already noted, however, there is no more clear-cut answer from 
the �tatute on the issue of burden of proof of value and the rig
ht to a 
?eficien�y than on the implied application of section 9-505(2). us By fram­
mg the issue as one governed by sections 9-504 and 9-507, the courts in 18 
142. Id. at 543. 
143·. Id. at 544. Although the case arose in New York, the contract stipulated th
at 
Connecticut law would govern. 
144. Id. at 544-45. 
145. Id. at 545. 
146. For � discussion of the implied application of § 9-505(2), see supra notes 29-43 
and accompanying text. 
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Genesee and Warnaco simply make all-important the individual state's 
interpretation of the deficiency issue under those provisions. Thus, while 
indisputably correct from an interpretative perspective, these decisions 
beg the ultimate question of who must prove what to win, thus contribut­
ing little or nothing to the quest for uniformity, certainty, and predict­
ability in this area. It is not the jurisprudence to which one can turn for 
solutions; article 9 itself must be amended to eliminate its ambiguities on 
creditors' rights and debtors' protections, and to embrace a more realistic 
approach to debtor relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Few would question that the Uniform Commercial Code was, collec­
tively, a magnificent accomplishment. By the same token, article 9 is gen­
erally conceded to be the crown jewel of the Code, its greatest 
achievement on both the theoretical and practical levels. 
The light of experience, however, has more than once shown that the 
luster of article 9 has faded. The 1972 amendments corrected many of the 
first generation of defects, but clearly others remain. It is hardly a new 
insight that the resale and deficiency provisions of article 9 have worked 
less than satisfactorily, and there have been recent calls to amend section 
9-504 and 9-507 on this account. 147 This article has attempted to reinforce 
this need for revision by reference to the related, but conceptually sepa­
rate, problem of involuntary strict foreclosure under section 9-505(2). 
The little commentary that this issue has heretofore attracted has 
generally been critical of the involuntary strict foreclosure doctrine.148 It 
is but a covert tool and, as Karl Llewellyn accurately observed, covert 
tools are not reliable ones.149 By the same token, however, it is unrealistic 
to think that a court will eschew covert tools unless it is given efficient 
overt tools with which to operate. 
Clearly, change is mandated. It is my belief that, given the state of 
the case law and its limited practical significance, the notice of retention 
· procedure in section 9-505(2) should be abandoned. In its place, the Code 
should simply empower the debtor and secured party to enter into, after 
default, any agreement regarding the settlement of the obligation that 
they desire as an alternative to disposition under section 9-504.1110 Such 
147. See, e.g., Donaldson, The Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral 
Under Article 9 of the UCC: The Question of Burden of Proof, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 307 (1988). 
148. See, e.g., R. ANDERSON, supra note 12, § 9-505:14, at 806-07; w. HAWKLAND, R. 
LORD & C. LEWIS, supra note 12, § 9-505:09; but see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, 
§ 25-8, at 1212 (indicating agreement with "delay plus facts" approach). Commonly, discus­
sions of § 9-505 either ignore the issue altogether or mention it only in passing without 
critical analysis. See, e.g. , Coagan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REv. 477, 523-24 
(1973); Garner & Alber, Disposition Of Repossessed Goods Under Article 9 of the Tex.as 
U.C.C., 11 Tux. 'I'EcH L. REv. 563 (1980). 
149. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702 (1939). 
150. Elimination of § 9-505 would not, of course, prevent a court from invoking the 
common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction, which would presumably be preserved 
under § 1- 103. As previously noted, however, the facts of most involuntary strict foreclosure 
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an agreement can be adequately policed on typical contract law bases, 
including the specific Code provisions on good faith161 and 
unconscionability. 1111 
In order to eliminate all vestiges of the involuntary strict foreclosure 
doctrine as well as to resolve the existing split of authority on deficiencies 
generally, section 9-504 should be amended to impose on the secured 
party seeking a deficiency in all cases the burden of proof that he has in 
every respect acted in a commercially reasonable manner.m Only such a 
rule can remove the temptation for judicial tinkering with the statute; 
likewise it is the only realistic approach to the problem, given the almost 
universally superior resources of the secured party. Courts have more 
than adequately demonstrated their lack of patience with a statutory 
scheme that on its face offers debtors only a right to damages for creditor 
misconduct. For purposes of symmetry, however, it likewise seems fair to 
impose the burden of proof upon the debtor seeking affirmative relief 
under section 9-507(1) (either compulsory disposition or damages), as op­
posed to a debtor who is asserting a defense to a deficiency action.15' 
Of course, no such changes will create a world in which all creditors 
act commercially reasonably, any more than all debtors will act fairly and 
responsibly with respect to collateral after default. What is hoped, how· 
ever, is that these changes would be a significant step towards more hon· 
est, rational, and predictable decisionmaking in an area where disputes 
are not only common but, like death and taxes, inevitable. 
Pending such statutory revisions, counsel for repossessing creditors 
should advise their clients, in any case in which disposition of the collat­
eral might be significantly delayed, to give written notice to the debtor 
expressly disclaiming any decision to retain in satisfaction under section 
9-505(2). Affirmative communication with the debtor would seem the best 
means of avoiding the involuntary strict foreclosure tarpit, since it is cer-
cases would not satisfy the accord and satisfaction doctrine, if it is properly applied. See 
supra notes 6, 90. 
While the special consumer goods rule in § 9-505(1)  may have been intended as a means 
of consu�er protection, I likewise believe that it serves little purpose. As previously noted, 
the rule is probably perverse in requiring a sale where 603 of the price has been paid; given 
�he rapid depreciation of most consumer goods, this would simply guarantee a deficiency 
Judgment. See text at supra note 48. 
151. u.c.c. § 1-203 (1987). 
152. Id. § 2-302. 
153. Cf. i�. � 3-307(3) (1987) (upon proof of defense, holder of negotiable instrument 
must prove he 1s m all respects holder in due course). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, 
supra note 12, § 25-16, at 1238-39 (noting that some courts have read in this requirement). 
154. See Donaldson, supra note 147, at 325-26 (suggesting this approach to § 9-507�; 
But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-507(1) (Supp. 1990) (statutorily adopting "damages only 
approa�h. to vi�lat�ons of § 9-504); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, § 25-16, at 1239 (recogmzmg. t�1s view but expressing skepticism that the burden of proof has much eff�ct). Whether sh1ftmg the burden of proof will, in fact, change the results of many cases 1s a 
matter that cannot easily be empirically established. Nonetheless, there seems to be little · 
sense in terms of a normative standard in imposing the burden on the party for whom proof 
costs are clearly disproportionate and who has inferior access to the basic facts at issue. 
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tainly difficult for a court to inf er an intent that is inconsistent with the 
creditor's own declared one. Written notice can serve as no guarantee, 
though, since actions ultimately speak more loudly than words. 
